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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 16-3601 
_______________ 
 
WILNICK DORVAL, 
 Appellant  
 
v. 
 
SAPPHIRE VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION; JAQUELINE LINDBERG; 
BERNARD VANSLUYTMAN; JOANNE LEVESQUE; CLARENCE LEVESQUE; 
LOURDES CORDERO; THOMAS CORDERO; SIDNEY JARVIS; NICHOLAS 
OMERMYER; RICHARD W. O’DELL; MICHELE LANGE; TODD FARRAND; 
NORA IBRAHIM; JONATHON MORGAN; SARAH WHYTE; ELLEN HANSEN; 
MICHAEL BAIRD; MATTHEW SWOPE; MARK MAROLE; MADLON JENKINS 
RUDZIAK; JAMES KOULOURIS; MADLON JENKINS-RUDZIAK 
       
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
 (3-16-cv-00050) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Curtis V. Gómez 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 4, 2017 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 8, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
                                                            
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
The appellant, Wilnick Dorval, brought the pending lawsuit against the 
Condominium Association of the rental in which he resides and twenty-one of his 
neighbors, alleging that they are harassing and discriminating against him on the basis of 
his race in violation of federal and local law, and that they are subjecting him to 
continuous noise disturbance in violation of local nuisance law.  Shortly after he filed the 
amended complaints with the District Court, Dorval also moved for a temporary 
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against six individual 
defendants who live or own apartments near his.  The District Court denied Dorval’s 
motion via an order, from which he now appeals.  Because we find that Dorval cannot 
demonstrate a reasonable probability of success, we will affirm.   
I. 
Dorval moved into his rental unit at Sapphire Village Condominiums on October 
2, 2015.  He alleges that his neighbors began conspiring to harass and discriminate 
against him on the basis of his race a mere three days after his move-in.  He alleges that 
his neighbors discriminated against him by “engaging in intense and severe noise 
nuisance,” and that the Condominium Association aided and abetted in their behavior by 
“failing to and selectively enforcing its By-laws, and Rules and Regulations, and 
allowing the owners, tenants and others to create a hostile environment for [him] in an 
effort to intimidate and drive [him] out of [his] home because [he is] black.”1  After 
                                                            
1 App. Vol. 2 at 2.  The appellant has filed ten appendix volumes in total.  Because the 
pagination starts anew with each volume, the citation to the record will include both a 
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suffering continued harassment, mainly in the form of excessive noise, sending more than 
800 emails to the Condominium’s management, and filing 14 police reports, Dorval 
initiated this lawsuit against twenty-one of his neighbors and the Condominium 
Association in June 2016, less than a year after he moved in.2   
Shortly after he filed his complaint with the court, Dorval also moved for a 
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against six 
of the individual defendants.3  Two of these defendants, occupying the apartments next to 
and above Dorval, “have been making and continue to purposely make loud banging and 
screaking sounds day and night to force [him] out of [his] home because [he is] black.”4  
The remaining four defendants, who do not reside in Sapphire Village but own 
apartments next to, above, and below Dorval, have allegedly failed to stop their tenants 
from making “constant and persistent excessive noise disturbances.”5  He thus sought to 
enjoin them from “interfer[ing] with [his] fair housing rights, and emanating any 
unreasonable noise or sound of any kind . . . .”6 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
volume and a page number.  Dorval’s motions to supplement the record with materials 
not presented to the District Court are denied. 
2 Dorval amended his complaint three times.  His Third Amended Complaint claimed 41 
counts against the defendants.   
3 Dorval filed an initial motion on August 25, 2016, against only two individual 
defendants.  He amended this motion on September 1, 2016, and added four additional 
defendants against whom he sought an injunction.  
4 App. Vol. 1 at 16.   
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 18.   
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Slightly more than a week after the amended motion for injunctive relief was filed, 
the District Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Dorval timely 
appealed.7  
II.8 
To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction,9 a plaintiff must 
demonstrate the following factors: (1) that he has “a reasonable probability of eventual 
success” on the merits; (2) that he “will be irreparably injured” absent injunctive relief; 
(3) that the balance of harms favors him; and (4) that the requested relief is in the public 
                                                            
7 With the exception of one defendant—who has retained an attorney that could not be 
reached by the Clerk’s Office—the remaining defendants are proceeding pro se.  None of 
the individual defendants filed a response brief.  Consequently, we will decide the case 
on the brief of the plaintiff-appellant only.  Fed. R. App. P. 31(c).   
8 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  The District Court in this 
case denied Dorval’s motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, 
and permanent injunction with an order that referred only to the request for a temporary 
restraining order.  See App. Vol. 1 at 5-6.  Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to 
review the denial or grant of a temporary restraining order.  Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 
569, 573 (3d Cir. 1991).  However, we may “[l]ook beyond terminology to the actual 
content, purport, and effect of that which may otherwise be described as a temporary 
restraining order or as a preliminary injunction.”  In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee 
Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 
186 (5th Cir. 1969)).  Here, the single order from the District Court appears to have 
terminated Dorval’s entire motion, which also requested a preliminary injunction, and 
there does not appear to be any further action taken on the preliminary injunction 
question separately.  Consequently, we determine that the District Court’s order denying 
the temporary restraining order was intended to also deny Dorval’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, a ruling we review for an abuse of discretion.  Bimbo Bakeries 
USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010).      
9 To the extent that Dorval also appeals the denial of a permanent injunction, that relief is 
not available to him at this pre-judgment juncture.  See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 
476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (the moving party must show “actual success on the merits” in 
order to obtain a permanent injunction). 
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interest.10  The first two factors are the “most critical,” and the failure to demonstrate 
either is fatal to the plaintiff’s request.11 
Here, Dorval is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because he has failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits.  Dorval brought his claims 
under federal law prohibiting racial discrimination in housing12 and in the making and 
enforcement of contracts;13 and under local law prohibiting racial discrimination14 and 
private nuisance.15  Dorval has not demonstrated, based upon the record before us, that he 
has a reasonable probability of meeting his burden of proof that the defendants’ behaviors 
were racially motivated, or that the allegedly excessive noise unreasonably and 
substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of his apartment.  The example that 
Dorval cites for his contention that he suffers “constant and persistent excessive noise 
disturbances” illustrates this deficiency.16  He describes being woken up by his 
downstairs neighbors at 7 a.m. with “loud banging noise disturbances,” which continued 
“well past 9 a.m.,” and being disturbed again at 6 p.m. when the “occupants of that 
apartment returned and deliberately slammed the front and screen doors repeatedly and 
made loud banging noise disturbances well past 7 p.m.”17  Despite Dorval’s protestation 
                                                            
10 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017).   
11 Id. at 179. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 
13 Id. § 1981. 
14 10 V.I.C. § 64. 
15 28 V.I.C. § 331. 
16 App. Vol. I at 18.   
17 Id. at 16.  
6 
 
that he was “unable to sleep, rest, read, write or enjoy [his] apartment” as a result of these 
noises, the described behavior appears to be neither harassing nor unreasonable.18 
Consequently, we hold that that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying to issue the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction at this stage.  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Dorval’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
                                                            
18 Id.       
